

# Monetary Policy under Sudden Stops

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

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\*The views expressed are those of the author and are not necessarily reflective of views at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.

# Sudden stops

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- Two stories



# Monetary policy under sudden stops



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- Facts
- A model for emerging markets
  - trade-offs created by sudden stops
  - allows the evaluation of monetary policy
- Responses to a sudden stop under alternative policies
  - Importance of the demand side
  - Peg more contractionary than flexible exchange rates
  - Relevance of monetary policy stance

# Facts

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- Collapse of domestic production and domestic demand




# A model for emerging markets

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- Balance sheet effects
- Debt denominated in foreign currency: the "original sin"
- Imported inputs

# A model for emerging markets

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# Wholesale firms

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- Technology for firm  $j$

$$Y_t(j) = A_t \left\{ \alpha^{\frac{1}{\phi}} L_t(j)^{\frac{\phi-1}{\phi}} + (1-\alpha)^{\frac{1}{\phi}} [\omega_t(j) Z_{t-1}(j)]^{\frac{\phi-1}{\phi}} \right\}^{\frac{\phi}{\phi-1}}$$

with

$\omega_t(j) \equiv$  idiosyncratic shock to productivity of imported input

$$E_t[\omega_{t+1}(j)] = 1$$

# Returns on imported inputs

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- Return on imported input defined as:

$$R_{Z,t+1}(j) \equiv \frac{P_{w,t+1} Y_Z(L_{t+1}(j), Z_t(j))}{S_t P_{Z,t}^*}$$

- Given idiosyncratic shock and CES assumption, can write

$$R_{Z,t+1}(j) = \omega_{t+1}(j) R_{Z,t+1}$$



# Foreign lenders


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- Foreigners perceptions

$$\omega_{t+1}^*(j) = \omega_{t+1}(j) \kappa_t$$

with

$$\kappa_t : \begin{cases} \text{normal times } (\mathcal{S}_t = \mathcal{N}) \Rightarrow \kappa_t = 1 \\ \text{sudden stop } (\mathcal{S}_t = \mathcal{U}) \Rightarrow \kappa_t \in [\kappa_{SS}, \kappa^{SS}] \end{cases}$$



# Balance sheet

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- Balance sheet:

$$S_t B_t(j) = S_t P_{Z,t}^* Z_t(j) - N_t(j)$$

- Debt contract satisfies:

$$\bar{\omega}_{t+1}(j) \frac{R_{Z,t+1} S_t P_{Z,t}^* Z_t(j)}{S_{t+1}} = R_{B,t}(j) B_t(j)$$

and

$$(1 + i_t^*) B_t(j) = E_t \left[ (1 - F^*(\bar{\omega}_{t+1}(j))) R_{B,t}(j) B_t(j) \right] \\ + (1 - \mu) E_t \left[ \int_0^{\bar{\omega}_{t+1}(j)} \omega^* \frac{R_{Z,t+1} S_t P_{Z,t}^* Z_t(j)}{S_{t+1}} dF^*(\omega^*) \right]$$

# Wholesale firms FOC

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- Firms choose  $Z_t(j)$ ,  $\bar{\omega}_t(j)$ ,  $R_{B,t}(j)$  and  $N_t(j)$
- All firms take the same decisions regarding these variables
- Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) relation:

$$(1 + i_t) E_t \left[ \frac{C_{t+1}^{-\sigma}}{P_{t+1}} \right] = (1 + i_t^*) E_t \left[ \frac{C_{t+1}^{-\sigma} S_{t+1}}{P_{t+1} S_t} \lambda_{t+1} \right]$$

- Return on imported inputs' risk premium relation:

$$E_t \left[ \frac{C_{t+1}^{-\sigma}}{P_{t+1}} \gamma_{t+1} R_{Z,t+1} \right] = (1 + i_t^*) E_t \left[ \frac{C_{t+1}^{-\sigma} S_{t+1}}{P_{t+1} S_t} \lambda_{t+1} \right]$$

# Risk premia

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- Different risk premia:

$SP_Z^*Z$	$N + \Pi_w$
$\Rightarrow R_Z$	$\Rightarrow (1 + i)$
	$SB$
	$\Rightarrow \tilde{R}_B$

- The return on imported inputs is the weighted average of capital costs

$$R_Z = (1 - b)(1 + i) + b\tilde{R}_B$$

with

$$b \equiv \frac{B}{P_Z^*Z}$$

# The transmission mechanism

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- Change in perceptions  $\Rightarrow$  foreigners demand higher risk premium
- Firms
  - reduce new purchases of the imported input
  - reduce debt and increase net worth (to reduce risk premium)  
 $\Rightarrow$  dividends are then reduced
- Households face tighter budget constraint due to lower dividends
  - cut consumption  $\Rightarrow$  lower domestic demand
- Firms face lower domestic demand
  - output falls
  - cut on labor  $\Rightarrow$  real wages fall  $\Rightarrow$  further constrains households' budget
- Balance of payments equilibrium implies real devaluation
  - expands foreign demand for the domestic good  
 $\Rightarrow$  dampens the impact on the total demand for the domestic good
  - contracts domestic demand for foreign good
  - higher cost of purchasing imported input

# The transmission mechanism

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- Three main effects:
  - cost-push shock (cost of purchasing and financing the imported input)
  - contraction of domestic demand
  - expansion of foreign demand

# Monetary policy

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- Monetary policy controls the interest rate using a simple rule:


$$\frac{1 + i_t}{1 + i} = \left( \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{\phi_{CPI}} \left( \frac{P_{H,t}}{P_{H,t-1}} \right)^{\phi_{DPI}} \left( \frac{Y_t}{Y} \right)^{\frac{\phi_Y}{4}} \left( \frac{S_t}{S_{t-1}} \right)^{\phi_S}$$

with

	$\phi_{CPI}$	$\phi_{DPI}$	$\phi_Y$	$\phi_S$
Peg	0	0	0	$\infty$
Taylor rule (CPI)	3	0	0.75	0
Taylor rule (DPI)	0	3	0.75	0
Inflation stabilization (CPI)	$\infty$	0	0	0
Inflation stabilization (DPI)	0	$\infty$	0	0

# Responses to a sudden stop: Peg vs. CPI Taylor

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
# Responses to a sudden stop: comparison to Chari et al

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- Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005)
  - sudden stop is equivalent to increase in net exports
  - therefore it leads to an expansion of the output
- In my model
  - that is only one side of the story
  - need to account for the fall in the domestic demand
- Reason for the difference:
  - in their model everything in tradables and foreign demand infinitely elastic


# Responses to a sudden stop: elastic foreign demand

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
# Responses to a sudden stop: degree of inflation reaction

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# Responses to a sudden stop: DPI stabilization

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# Concluding remarks

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- Presented a framework tailored for emerging markets and suitable for monetary policy analysis
  - It does match some of the facts associated to sudden stops
  - Showed the importance of the demand side
- Confirmed that a peg is more contractionary than flexible exchange rates
- Showed the importance of the monetary policy stance (towards inflation)
  - more than focus on changes of the interest rate

# Future work

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- Framework simplifies welfare evaluation allowing for further discussion of policy issues:
  - welfare comparison of alternative rules
  - optimal policy
  - discretion vs. commitment
- Shock is structural enough to allow for further extensions
  - allowing it to react to state variables