

Financially Constrained Innovation, Patent Protection, and Industry Dynamics

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 - literature on entrepreneurial financing

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- Breadth (lagging breadth): protection against imitation

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 - Industry model – equilibrium (q_t, x_t, v_t)

Findings

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- Data on venture capital?

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