Equilibrium Unemployment, Job Flows and Inflation Dynamics*

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Abstract

In order to explain the joint fluctuations of output, inflation and the labor market, this paper develops and estimates a general equilibrium model that integrates a theory of equilibrium unemployment into a monetary model with nominal price rigidities. The estimated model accounts for the responses of employment, hours per worker, job creation and job destruction to a monetary policy shock. Moreover, search frictions in the labor market generate a lower elasticity of marginal costs with respect to output. This helps to explain the sluggishness of inflation and the persistence of output that are observed in the data.

Keywords: DSGE Models, Sticky Prices, Labor-Market Search, Monetary Policy Shocks

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1 Introduction

A classic challenge that macroeconomists face is to explain the cyclical fluctuations of output, unemployment and inflation. Recently, New Keynesian (NK) business cycle models have made important advances in explaining the links between money and the joint dynamics of output and inflation.[1] However, the standard NK model abstracts from unemployment as it assumes a neoclassical labor market in which individuals vary the hours that they work, but the number of people working never changes. This of course implies that the model cannot account for evidence regarding the effects of aggregate shocks, in particular monetary shocks, on unemployment dynamics. Moreover, when accounting for the joint response of output and inflation to monetary shocks, the standard NK model has a great difficulty in replicating the sluggish response of inflation together with the large and persistent response of output. One key reason for this difficulty is that the model has the labor input adjusting along the intensive margin, which makes real wages very responsive over the cycle unless an implausibly high labor supply elasticity is assumed. This in turn induces firms setting prices as a markup over marginal costs to make large price adjustment and causes inflation in the model to fluctuate more than evidence suggests. Based on these and related considerations, several recent papers have argued that labor market frictions are crucial to understanding business cycle fluctuations, as well as the effects of monetary shocks and the design of monetary policies.[2] The search and matching model, along the lines of the work of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), is a natural way of thinking about these frictions.

In this paper I develop a dynamic general equilibrium model that integrates labor market search and endogenous job destruction into an otherwise standard NK model with nominal price rigidities.[3] I show that introducing search and matching frictions modifies the nature of real marginal costs faced by firms in a way that lowers the elasticity of marginal costs with respect to output and thus help to account for the observed inertia in inflation and persistence in output. In the model changes in output can be obtained through either changes in the number of hours worked, the intensive margin, or changes in the number of employed people, the extensive margin. With demand-constrained firms, the two margins will adjust to meet demand so that their marginal costs are equalized. To gain some intuition, note that although hours worked by each employed worker are chosen thorough bargaining, the marginal cost of hours is determined by the workers' marginal disutility from supplying labor, much the same way as in a neoclassical labor market. However, while in a neoclassical framework all variation of the labor input occurs at the intensive margin, which is very costly when the labor supply elasticity is not implausibly high, with equilibrium un-

[1] See Galì (2003) for a recent survey.

[2] Among these see Galì, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters (2003), Levin, Onatski, Williams and Williams (2005).

[3] Early work by Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996), Hairault (2002) and den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) has considered search and matching in a real business cycle model. Cooley and Quadrini (1999) integrate a model of equilibrium unemployment with a limited participation model of money.

employment firms can change employment at the extensive margin. The cost of producing output through changes in the number of employed workers in a framework with hiring frictions and long-term employment relationships has two components. The marginal cost increases with the flow cost of having one additional worker employed but decreases with the expected future payoff from continuing the relationship in the following periods that adding a new worker to the economy's employment stock entails. These dynamic considerations introduce an effect of private spending on the economy's productive capacity and future supply costs, making the extensive margin relatively less costly and inducing firms to adjust the labor input mostly at the extensive margin, as we observe in the data.

After developing the theoretical model, I estimate a set of structural parameters that characterize the dynamics of the labor market and on which there is little or no independent evidence. I follow the limited information estimation strategy adopted in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and others. Specifically, the structural parameters are chosen so that the impulse responses to a monetary shock of a set of endogenous variables in the model match as closely as possible the responses estimated using a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) methodology. While the minimum distance estimation strategy is widely adopted in the literature on dynamic general equilibrium models with money, no other study, to the best of my knowledge, has used it to estimate the parameters of a labor market characterized by matching frictions and endogenous job destruction.

In order to evaluate the model I proceed in two steps. First, I assess the contribution of labor market frictions in shaping the joint dynamics of output and inflation by comparing the predictions of the model developed in this paper with those of a NK model that does not have search and matching frictions but keeps all other features the same. This implies that any difference in the dynamics of the two models must be associated with search and matching frictions. Second, I evaluate the ability of the model to account for the observed responses of output, inflation and the labor market to a monetary policy shock in the U.S. economy.

I show that in the model with labor market search the response of inflation is significantly less volatile and the response of output considerably more persistent than in the baseline NK model. In other words, labor market frictions play an important role in shaping the dynamics of output and inflation. In addition, the estimated model does a good job in accounting quantitatively for the response of the U.S. economy to a monetary policy shock. The model can reproduce the large response of output together with the sluggish response of inflation. It also accounts for the large, persistent decrease in employment together with the small, transitory fall in average hours per worker. Finally, it explains the transitory fall in job creation and the larger and more persistent raise in job destruction. It is important to point out that the ability of the model to account for the joint dynamics of output and inflation relies on its ability to explain the dynamics in the labor market, thus imposing more discipline when evaluating the model.

Independent work by Walsh (2005) also studies the interaction between price rigidities and labor-market search. There are three main differences with this paper. First, his work considers only the extensive margin, while I consider the intensive as well as the extensive margin. This allows me to explain the dynamics of hours per worker over the cycle as well as the dynamics of employment and to clarify how the interaction between the two margins shapes real marginal costs. Second, rather than taking a stand on all the possible sources of fluctuations in the economy, I evaluate the empirical performance of the model based on its ability to match conditional second moments, i.e., second moment conditional on a particular source of fluctuations.[4] Third, I provide estimates of a set of the structural parameters that characterize a labor market with search and matching frictions.

The recent papers by Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) show that when staggered nominal wage setting (possibly with indexation) is included, along with a number of other features also present in this paper, a more conventional NK model without search can also match the responses of output and inflation to a monetary shock. These papers, however, have employment adjusting along the intensive margin. That is, wage stickiness affects fluctuations in hours worked as opposed to total employment. As a consequence, these frameworks are subject to the Barro's (1977) argument that wages may not be allocational in this kind of environment, given that firms and workers have an on-going relationship. If wages are not allocational, of course, then wage rigidity does not influence the dynamics of the model. For this reason, relying on staggered nominal wage setting, while having employment varying at the extensive margin, to explain inflation persistence and output dynamics is not completely satisfactory.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the evidence related to the response of output, inflation and the labor market to a monetary shock, Section 3 describes the model, Section 4 presents the dynamics of the model around the steady state, Section 5 analyses the determination of real marginal costs with search and matching frictions, Section 6 brings the model to the data and discusses the estimation, Section 7 presents the results and Section 8 concludes.

2 Evidence: output, inflation and the labor market

In this Section I describe a set of stylized facts related to the behavior of output, inflation and a set of labor market variables in face of a monetary policy shock. The evidence regarding the response of the labor market to a monetary shock is new in the literature. More specifically, I use a VAR methodology to estimate the dynamic response of the variables of interest to an identified exogenous monetary policy shock. The short-term nominal interest rate is taken to be the instrument of monetary policy and the identification strategy is described in the Appendix.

The variables included in the analysis are measures of output, inflation and the nominal interest rate, to which I add four labor market variables. The labor market variables that I include are measures of employment, average hours per worker, the job creation rate and the job destruction rate. I include four lagged values of all variables in the VAR. Estimates are based on quarterly U.S.

[4] The advantages of this evaluation criterion are presented in Galí (1999).

data from 1972:2 to 1993:4.[5]

The series for the nominal interest rate is the Federal Funds rate, annualized and averaged over the quarter. The series for output is the log of quarterly real GDP and the series for inflation is the annualized rate of change of the GDP deflator between two consecutive quarters. The series for employment is the log of total employees in nonfarm establishments. The series for average hours per worker is constructed by subtracting the previous variable from the log of total employee-hours in nonagricultural establishments. Finally, the series for job creation and job destruction are taken from Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh "Job Creation and Destruction" database. They are, respectively, the log of the quarterly job creation rate for both startups and continuing establishments in the manufacturing sector and the log of the quarterly job destruction rate for both shutdowns and continuing establishments in the manufacturing sector.

Figure 1 reports the responses over time of output, inflation and the Federal funds rate to a one percent increase in the Federal funds rate and Figure 2 the responses of employment, average hours per worker, the job creation rate and the job destruction rate to the same shock. The solid lines display the point estimates of the coefficients. The dashed lines are two standard deviation confidence intervals. The impulse response functions of inflation and the Federal funds rate are reported in percentage points. The other impulse responses are reported in percentage deviations from each variable's unconditional mean. The horizontal axis indicate quarters.

The results suggested by Figure 1 are standard in the VAR literature on monetary policy. After a contractionary monetary shock there is a large hump-shaped fall in output accompanied by a sluggish persistent decrease in inflation. The peak fall in output is about 0.4 percent and that of annualized inflation about 0.3 percent. Existing optimizing monetary general equilibrium models have shown difficulties in explaining this joint dynamic behavior of output and inflation. In their baseline version, unless a large value of the labor supply elasticity is assumed, they predict a much larger response of inflation.

Figure 2, instead, presents some new results about the response of the labor market to a monetary shock. First, as we can see from the plots, the labor input adjusts along both the extensive and the intensive margin. As a consequence of the tightening in monetary policy, both employment and hours per worker fall. However, while the fall in employment is large and persistent, there is only a small transitory decrease in hours per worker. Therefore, the labor input shows a significantly different cyclical behavior at the extensive and the intensive margin. Second, the response of employment is explained by variations at both the job creation and the job destruction margin. The monetary contraction causes a fall in job creation and a raise in job destruction. The decrease in job creation is transitory with a peak response of about 3.4 percent, while the increase in job destruction is larger and more persistent with a peak response of about 4.5 percent.

Finally, note that the tightening in monetary policy has a significant effect on output, employ-

[5] The choice of the sample period is explained by the availability of the data on job creation and job destruction.

ment, hours per worker, job creation and job destruction only after two quarters.[6] In order to reproduce this feature of U.S. data, following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and others, I will introduce informational lags in the decisions to consume, set prices, post vacancies and endogenously severe a match. To keep notation simple, I defer the description of the informational lags till the end of next section.

3 The model

The proposed model with nominal price rigidities and search and matching in the labor market has four sectors. The sectors include the households, the intermediate goods firms, the retail firms and a monetary authority. Each sector's environment is discussed in detail below.

3.1 Households

Each household is thought of as a very large extended family which contains a continuum of members with names on the unit interval. In equilibrium, some members will be unemployed while some others will be working for firms. Each member has the following period utility function:

$$u(c_t, c_{t-1}) - g\left(h_t, a_t\right), \tag{1}$$

where

$$u(c_t, c_{t-1}) = \log\left(c_t - ec_{t-1}\right) \tag{2}$$

and

$$g\left(h_t, a_t\right) = \kappa_h \frac{h_t^{1+\phi}}{1+\phi} + \chi_t a_t. \tag{3}$$

The variable c_t is consumption of a final good, h_t is the hours of work, a_t is a shock to the disutility from working and χ_t is an indicator function taking the value of one if the individual is employed and zero if unemployed. When $e > 0$, the model allows for habit formation in consumption.[7] The preference shock a_t is idiosyncratic to the individual and is assumed to be independently and identically distributed across individuals and times with cumulative distribution function $F\left(a_t\right)$. The cumulative distribution function $F\left(a_t\right)$ is assumed to be lognormal with parameters μ_a and σ_a.

[6] At the same time, the response of inflation presents the well known "price puzzle".

[7] McCallum and Nelson (1999), Fuhrer (2000) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) show that habit formation in consumption preferences is important to understand the transmission mechanism of monetary shocks. In particular, it helps to account for the hump-shaped decrease in consumption together with the rise in the real interest rate after a contractionary monetary shock. In this paper, habit persistence in consumption is also important to account for the response of the labor market. Without habit persistence, the largest change in consumption and output (since output is demand-determined) would occur in the first period following the monetary shock. Since employment, as it will be clear below, moves gradually, hours per worker would fluctuate significantly in the first period in order to accommodate the initial change in output. In the data, however, the initial response of hours per worker is relatively small.

A high preference shock a_t causes a high disutility from working. Assuming that the idiosyncratic shock enters additively avoids the problem of excessive variation in hours worked across individuals. In particular, since individuals are identical in all aspects other than the preference shock, it will be the case that they all work the same number of hours.[8]

The representative household maximizes lifetime utility:

$$E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s \left[u(c_{t+s}, c_{t+s-1}) - G_{t+s} \right], \tag{4}$$

where $\beta \in (0,1)$ is the intertemporal discount factor and c_t is per capita consumption of each family member at date t.[9] The variable G_t denotes the family's disutility from supplying hours of work at date t, i.e., the sum of the disutilities of the members who are employed and supply hours of work. The representative household does not choose hours of work. These are determined through decentralized bargaining between firms and workers. Therefore, for simplicity, I do not make explicit the family' disutility term at this point.[10]

Households own all firms in the economy and face, in each period, the following budget constraint:

$$c_t + \frac{B_t}{p_t r_t^n} = d_t + \frac{B_{t-1}}{p_t}, \tag{5}$$

where p_t is the aggregate price level, B_t is per capita holdings of a nominal one-period bond and r_t^n is the gross nominal interest rate on this bond. The variable d_t is the per capita family income in period t.[11]

The representative household chooses consumption and asset holdings to maximize (4) subject to (5), which yields:

$$\lambda_t = \beta E_t \left[r_t \lambda_{t+1} \right], \tag{6}$$

where λ_t is the marginal utility of consumption and r_t is the gross real interest rate.

3.2 Firms and the labor market

The model that I develop in this paper is characterized by two main building blocks: nominal rigidities in price setting and search and matching frictions in the labor market. One complication is that when firms set prices on a staggered basis the job creation and destruction decisions become

[8] The literature typically assumes multiplicative productivity shocks. See Cooley and Quadrini (1999) for an alternative example of additive idiosyncratic shocks.

[9] To avoid distributional issues from heterogeneity, I follow Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) in assuming that family members perfectly insure each other against fluctuations in consumption.

[10] This term is nevertheless important to derive the surplus from employment for a worker from the family problem. See the Appendix for details.

[11] The family income is the sum of the wage income earned by employed family members, the benefits earned by unemployed family members and the family share of aggregate profits from retailers and matched firms, net of a government lump-sum tax used to finance unemployment benefits.

highly intractable. To avoid this problem I distinguish between two types of firms: retail firms and intermediate goods firms.[12] For simplicity, I will often refer to retail firms as retailers and to intermediate goods firms as simply firms. Firms produce intermediate goods in competitive markets using labor as their only input, and then sell their output to retailers who are monopolistic competitive. Retailers, finally, sell final goods to the households. Then, I assume that price rigidities arise at the retail level, while search frictions occur in the intermediate goods sector. In this section I describe the problem of intermediate goods firms.

3.2.1 Matching market and production

In order to match with a worker, firms must actively search for workers in the unemployment pool. This idea is formalized by assuming that firms post vacancies. On the other hand, unemployed workers must look for firms. I assume that all unemployed workers search passively for jobs.

Each firm has a single job that can either be filled or vacant and searching for a worker. Workers can be either employed or unemployed and searching for a job.[13]

Vacancies, v_t, are matched to workers seeking for a job, u_t, according to the following CRS matching function:

$$m_t = \sigma_m u_t^{\sigma} v_t^{1-\sigma}, \tag{7}$$

where σ_m is a scale parameter reflecting the efficiency of the matching process.

The probability that any open vacancy is matched with a searching worker at date t is denoted with q_t and is given by:

$$q_t = \frac{m_t}{v_t}. \tag{8}$$

Similarly, the probability that any worker looking for a job is matched with an open vacancy at time t is denoted with s_t and is given by:

$$s_t = \frac{m_t}{u_t}. \tag{9}$$

If the search process is successful, the firm operates a production function $f(h_t) = h_t$, where h_t is the time spent working at date t. Employment relationships might be severed for exogenous reasons at the beginning of any given period. I denote with ρ^x the probability of exogenous separation. Furthermore, a matched pair may chose to separate endogenously. If the realization of the idiosyncratic preference disturbance a_t is above a certain threshold, which I denote $\underline{a}_t$, a

[12] This modelling device has first been introduced by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) in their study of the financial accelerator mechanism. Alternatively, this problem could be avoided by assuming quadratic price adjustment costs, as in Krause and Lubik (2005). Results and model solution are equivalent, implying that nothing is lost by considering the price setting decision separately from the job creation and destruction decisions. The only difference is the interpretation of the coefficient on marginal costs in the Phillips curve.

[13] All unmatched workers are assumed to be part of the unemployed pool, i.e., I abstract from workers' labor force participation decisions.

firm and a worker discontinue their relationship. The probability of endogenous separation is $\rho_t^n = \Pr(a_t > \underline{a}_t) = 1 - F(\underline{a}_t)$ and the overall separation rate is $\rho_t = \rho^x + (1-\rho^x)\rho_t^n$. If either exogenous or endogenous separation occurs, production does not take place.

Employment evolves according to the following dynamic equation:

$$n_t = \left(1 - \rho_{t-1}\right) n_{t-1} + m_{t-1}, \tag{10}$$

which simply says that the number of matched workers at the beginning of period t, n_t, is given by the fraction of matches in $t-1$ that survives to the next period, $\left(1-\rho_{t-1}\right) n_{t-1}$, plus the newly-formed matches, m_{t-1}.

The labor force being normalized to one, the number of unemployed workers at the beginning of any given period is $1-n_t$. This is different from the number of searching workers in period t, u_t, which is given by:

$$u_t = 1 - (1-\rho_t)\, n_t \tag{11}$$

since some of the employed workers discontinue their match and search for a new job in the same period.

3.2.2 Bellman equations

To make the exposition of the following sections easier, I describe here the Bellman equations that characterize the problem of firms and workers.

Denote with J_t the value of a job for a firm at date t measured in terms of current consumption of the final good. This is given by:

$$J_t(a_t) = x_t f(h_t) - w_t(a_t) h_t + E_t \beta_{t,t+1} \left(1-\rho_{t+1}\right) \int_0^{\underline{a}_{t+1}} J_{t+1}(a_{t+1}) \frac{dF(a_{t+1})}{F\left(\underline{a}_{t+1}\right)}, \tag{12}$$

where x_t and w_t denote, respectively, the relative price of the intermediate good and the hourly wage rate at date t. Note that the hourly wage rate depends on the realization of the preference shock. The value of the job is the current profits $x_t f(h_t) - w_t(a_t) h_t$ plus the continuation value. Next period, with probability $1-\rho_{t+1}$ the match is not severed. In this event the firm obtains the future expected value of a job, where the expected value is conditional on having the preference shock a_{t+1} below the separation threshold $\underline{a}_{t+1}$. With probability ρ_{t+1}, instead, the match is discontinued in $t+1$ and the firm obtains a future value equal to zero. Finally, the expected future value of the job is discounted according to the factor $\beta_{t,t+1}$, where $\beta_{t,t+s} = \frac{\beta^s \lambda_{t+s}}{\lambda_t}$.[14]

Denote with V_t the value of an open vacancy for a firm at date t expressed in terms of current consumption. Letting κ be the utility cost of keeping a vacancy open, V_t can be written as:

$$V_t = -\frac{\kappa}{\lambda_t} + E_t \beta_{t,t+1} \left[q_t \left(1-\rho_{t+1}\right) \int_0^{\underline{a}_{t+1}} J_{t+1}(a_{t+1}) \frac{dF(a_{t+1})}{F\left(\underline{a}_{t+1}\right)} + (1-q_t) V_{t+1} \right], \tag{13}$$

[14] The use of this discount factor effectively evaluates profits in terms of the values attached to them by the households, who ultimately own firms.

where $\frac{\kappa}{\lambda_t}$ is the utility cost expressed in terms of current consumption.

Denote now with W_t and U_t, respectively, the employment and the unemployment value for a worker at date t expressed in terms of current consumption.[15] The value of employment W_t can be written as:

$$W_t(a_t) = w_t(a_t) h_t - \frac{g(h_t, a_t)}{\lambda_t} + E_t\beta_{t,t+1}\left[\left(1-\rho_{t+1}\right)\int_0^{\underline{a}_{t+1}} \left(W_{t+1}(a_{t+1}) - U_{t+1}\right)\frac{dF(a_{t+1})}{F(\underline{a}_{t+1})} + U_{t+1}\right], \tag{14}$$

where $\frac{g(h_t,a_t)}{\lambda_t}$ is the disutility from supplying hours expressed in terms of current consumption.

Finally, the value of unemployment U_t is given by:

$$U_t = b + E_t\beta_{t,t+1}\left[s_t\left(1-\rho_{t+1}\right)\int_0^{\underline{a}_{t+1}} \left(W_{t+1}(a_{t+1}) - U_{t+1}\right)\frac{dF(a_{t+1})}{F(\underline{a}_{t+1})} + U_{t+1}\right], \tag{15}$$

where b is the flow value of being unemployed, taken to be unemployment benefits.

3.2.3 Vacancy posting

As long as the value of a vacancy V_t is greater than zero, firms will open new vacancies. In equilibrium, free entry ensures that $V_t = 0$ at any time t. Hence, from (13) the condition for the posting of new vacancies is:

$$\frac{\kappa}{\lambda_t q_t} = E_t\beta_{t,t+1}\left(1-\rho_{t+1}\right)\int_0^{\underline{a}_{t+1}} J_{t+1}(a_{t+1})\frac{dF(a_{t+1})}{F(\underline{a}_{t+1})}. \tag{16}$$

Noting that $1/q_t$ is the expected duration of an open vacancy, equation (16) simply says that in equilibrium the expected cost of hiring a worker is equal to the expected value of a match.

Equation (16) implies that, holding constant λ_t, a decrease in the sum of expected future profits must be associated with an increase in q_t. Given the specification of the matching function, this requires either a decrease in the number of vacancies posted, v_t, or an increase in the number of searching workers, u_t. If job destruction was exogenous, the number of searching workers would not change together with the number of vacancies, but only the following period. In this case, the increase in q_t would be unambiguously associated with a fall in v_t. The decrease in the number of posted vacancies, in turn, would cause a decrease in next period employment, $n_{t+1.}$ With endogenous job destruction, instead, the number of searching workers changes together with the number of vacancies. In particular, if the decrease in profits is caused by a persistent contractionary aggregate shock, as I discuss below, the job destruction rate ρ_t is likely to increase and so is the number of workers searching for a job, u_t. However, unless the increase in the number of searching workers is extremely large, the raise in q_t will be associated with a fall in v_t. Monetary policy shocks will

[15] Because there is perfect income insurance it is not straightforward to define these values. In the Appendix, I show how the worker surplus, $W_t - U_t$, can be derived from the family problem.

affect the rate at which vacancies are posted and, consequently, employment through the above mechanism.

Specifically, a persistent raise in the nominal interest rate, which results in an increase in the real interest rate due to price rigidities, reduces current and future aggregate demand. Since monopolistic competitive retailers produce to meet demand, this diminishes their current and future demand for intermediate goods, which they use as inputs. The resulting persistent decrease in the relative price of intermediate goods, x_t, leads to a fall in firms' expected future profits. The fall in profits, finally, decreases the number of posted vacancies and reduces employment next period.

Finally, note that equation (16) can be rearranged to a first-order difference equation in q_t:

$$\frac{\kappa}{\lambda_t q_t} = E_t \beta_{t,t+1} \left(1 - \rho_{t+1}\right) \left(x_{t+1} h_{t+1} - w_{t+1} h_{t+1} + \frac{\kappa}{\lambda_{t+1} q_{t+1}} \right), \tag{17}$$

where w_t is the aggregate wage:

$$w_t = \int_0^{\underline{a}_t} w_t \left(a_t\right) \frac{dF(a_t)}{F(\underline{a}_t)}. \tag{18}$$

3.2.4 Bargaining over wages and hours

Bargaining takes place along two dimensions, the real wage and the hours of work. I assume Nash bargaining. That is, the firm and the worker choose the wage w_t and the hours of work h_t to maximize the Nash product:

$$\left(W_t \left(a_t\right) - U_t\right)^{\eta} \left(J_t \left(a_t\right) - V_t\right)^{1-\eta}, \tag{19}$$

where the first term in brackets is the worker's surplus, the second is the firm's surplus, and $\eta \in (0, 1)$ reflects the parties' relative bargaining power.

Because the firm and the worker bargain simultaneously about wages and hours, the outcome is (privately) efficient and the wage does not play an allocational role for hours.[16] The Nash bargaining model, in effect, is equivalent to one where hours are chosen to maximize the joint surplus of the match, while the wage is set to split that surplus according to the parameter η.[17]

The wage chosen by the match satisfies the optimality condition:

$$\eta J_t \left(a_t\right) = \left(1 - \eta\right) \left(W_t \left(a_t\right) - U_t\right). \tag{20}$$

As just mentioned, this condition implies that the total surplus that a job match creates is shared according to the parameter η. Although (20) explicitly takes into account the dynamic implications

[16] It must be emphasized that the outcome predicted by the Nash bargaining model is generally *not* efficient from the viewpoint of society as a whole (Hosios, 1990).

[17] In Trigari (2004b) I develop an alternative bargaining model where firms have the right-to-manage hours, implying that the choice of hours is not privately efficient from the perspective of the match. The model delivers interesting implications for the relation between wages and marginal costs.

of the match, it can be rewritten as a wage equation that only includes contemporaneous variables. To this purpose, substitute (12), (14) and (15) into (20), using also (16). This gives the following wage equation:

$$w_t(a_t)\, h_t = \eta \left(x_t f(h_t) + \frac{\kappa}{\lambda_t}\theta_t \right) + (1-\eta)\left(\frac{g(h_t, a_t)}{\lambda_t} + b \right), \tag{21}$$

where $\theta_t = v_t/u_t$ is the labor market tightness. The wage shares costs and benefits from the activity of the match according to the parameter η. The worker is rewarded for a fraction η of the firm's revenues and savings of hiring costs and compensated for a fraction $1-\eta$ of the disutility he suffers from supplying hours of work and the foregone unemployments benefits.[18] Note that a high preference shock a_t causes a high wage.

Let us now turn to the determination of hours. The hours of work, h_t, chosen by the match satisfy the following optimality condition:

$$\eta J_t(a_t) \left(\frac{g_h(h_t, a_t)}{\lambda_t} - w_t(a_t) \right) = (1-\eta)\left(W_t(a_t) - U_t\right)\left(x_t f_h(h_t) - w_t(a_t)\right), \tag{22}$$

which can be simplified, using (20), to:

$$x_t f_h(h_t) = \frac{g_h(h_t, a_t)}{\lambda_t}, \tag{23}$$

where the value of the marginal product of labor is equated to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. Thus, the first order condition determining the hours worked is exactly the same as in a competitive labor market. This happens because the correct measure of labor costs to the firm is the marginal rate of substitution, rather than the wage. In other words, the wage is not allocational for hours. Using the expressions for $f(h_t)$ and $g(h_t, a_t)$, the optimal hours condition becomes:

$$x_t = \kappa_h \frac{h_t^{\phi}}{\lambda_t}, \tag{24}$$

which clearly shows that optimal hours do not depend on the realization of the preference shock. Note also that, as previously mentioned, the choice of hours that solves the bargaining problem also maximizes the joint surplus.

3.2.5 Endogenous separation

Let $S_t(a_t) = J_t(a_t) + W_t(a_t) - U_t$ be the joint surplus from the match. Using (12), (14) and (15), together with (20), yields the following expression for $S_t(a_t)$:

$$S_t(a_t) = x_t f(h_t) - \frac{g(h_t, a_t)}{\lambda_t} - b + (1-\eta s_t) E_t \beta_{t,t+1} \left(1-\rho_{t+1}\right) \int_0^{\underline{a}_{t+1}} S_{t+1}(a_{t+1}) \frac{dF(a_{t+1})}{F\left(\underline{a}_{t+1}\right)}. \tag{25}$$

[18] The term $\frac{\kappa}{\lambda_t} v_t$ reflects the total hiring cost in the economy. Then, $\frac{\kappa}{\lambda_t}\theta_t$ is the hiring cost per unemployed worker.

The total surplus equals current revenues net of the disutility from supplying hours and the forgone unemployment benefit, plus the continuation value. The latter gives the current expected value of future joint payoffs from continuing the relationship in the following periods.

A successful match is endogenously discontinued whenever the realization of the preference shock makes the value of the joint surplus equal to zero or negative. Then, the condition that implicitly defines the threshold value $\underline{a}_t$ is $S_t(\underline{a}_t) = 0$. Using equations (16) and (20) in (25), and rearranging yields:

$$x_t f(h_t) - \frac{g(h_t, \underline{a}_t)}{\lambda_t} - b + \frac{1 - \eta s_t}{1 - \eta} \frac{\kappa}{\lambda_t q_t} = 0. \tag{26}$$

Equation (26) implies that a fall in the expected future joint payoffs from continuing the relationship, $\frac{1-\eta s_t}{1-\eta}\frac{\kappa}{\lambda_t q_t}$, must be associated with an increase in the current joint payoffs evaluated at the threshold value, $x_t f(h_t) - \frac{g(h_t, \underline{a}_t)}{\lambda_t} - b$. If the decrease in the expected future payoffs is caused by a persistent contractionary aggregate shock, current payoffs at any given realization of the preference shock a_t are falling as well. In this case, the increase in current payoffs can only be obtained through a decrease in $\underline{a}_t$. Monetary policy shocks will affect the separation decision of firms and workers and, consequently, employment through the above mechanism. A persistent increase in the nominal interest rate reduces current and future expected payoffs at any given realization of a_t. This, in turn, decreases the value of a_t above which the firm and the worker decide to separate. A lower threshold $\underline{a}_t$ raises the current separation rate ρ_t on impact and decreases the number of workers producing within the same period.

3.2.6 Job creation, job destruction and employment

I define labor market flows following den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000). They begin with the observation that flows of workers out of employment relationships are larger than flows of jobs out of firms. This implies that a fraction of the firms experiencing separations from workers must attempt to refill the jobs left vacant and be successful at doing it within the same period. To take this observation into account, they assume that firms experiencing exogenous separations immediately repost the resulting vacancies, while firms experiencing endogenous separations do not. This implies that $\rho^x n_t$ separations are reposted and $q_t \rho^x n_t$ separations are refilled within the same period. Finally, they assume that a job is neither created or destroyed by a firm that both looses and gains a worker in the same period.

Job creation, then, is defined to be equal to the number of newly-created matches net of the number of matches serving to refill the reposted vacancies. The job creation rate is given by:

$$jc_t = \frac{m_t}{n_t} - q_t \rho^x \tag{27}$$

Job destruction, in turn, is defined as the total number of separations net of the number of separations that are reposted and successfully refilled. The job destruction rate is given by:

$$jd_t = \rho_t - q_t \rho^x \tag{28}$$

Employment variation, finally, is the outcome of job creation and job separation decisions of firms and workers. Substituting (27) and (28) into (10) and rearranging, I obtain:

$$\frac{n_{t+1} - n_t}{n_t} = jc_t - jd_t. \tag{29}$$

3.3 Retailers and price setting

There is a continuum of monopolistic competitive retailers indexed by i on the unit interval. Retailers do nothing other than buy intermediate goods from firms, differentiate them with a technology that transforms one unit of intermediate goods into one unit of retail goods, then re-sell them to the households. Note that the relative price of intermediate goods, x_t, coincides with the real marginal cost faced by the retailers.

Let y_{it} be the quantity of output sold by retailer i and let p_{it} be the nominal sale price. Final goods, denoted with y_t, are the following composite of individual retail goods:

$$y_t = \left[\int_0^1 y_{it}^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} di \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}, \tag{30}$$

where ε, which is assumed to be greater than one, is the elasticity of substitution across the differentiated retail goods. Then, the demand curve facing each retailer is given by:

$$y_{it} = \left(\frac{p_{it}}{p_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon} y_t, \tag{31}$$

where p_t is the aggregate price index:

$$p_t = \left[\int_0^1 p_{it}^{1-\varepsilon} di \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}. \tag{32}$$

As in Calvo (1983), I assume that in any given period each retailer can reset its price with a fixed probability $1-\varphi$ that is independent of the time elapsed since the last price adjustment. Moreover, I follow Galí and Gertler (1999) by assuming that there are two types of retailers that differ in the way they reset prices. A fraction $1-\omega$ of the retailers, which are referred to as "forward-looking", set prices optimally, given the restriction on the frequency with which they can adjust their price. The remaining fraction ω of the retailers, which are referred to as "backward-looking", instead follow a simple rule of thumb.[19]

Let p_t^f be the price set by the forward-looking retailers and p_t^b the price set by the backward-looking retailers. Forward-looking retailers choose their price to maximize expected future discounted profits given the demand for the good they produce and under the hypothesis that the

[19] Modeling a fraction of the retailers as backward-looking introduces a term with lagged inflation in the Phillips curve and helps to explain inflation inertia. Note that this assumption is essentially equivalent to the alternative hypothesis made in the literature that non-reoptimized prices are simply indexed to lagged inflation, as in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005).

price they set at date t applies at date $t+s$ with probability φ^s. The solution to this problem gives:

$$p_t^f = \mu E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \omega_{t,t+s} x_{t+s}^n, \tag{33}$$

where $\mu = \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}$ is the flexible-price markup and $x_t^n = p_t x_t$ is the nominal marginal cost at date t. The weights $\omega_{t,t+s}$ are given by:

$$\omega_{t,t+s} = \frac{\varphi^s \beta_{t,t+s} R_{it,t+s}}{E_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \varphi^k \beta_{t,t+k} R_{it,t+k}}, \tag{34}$$

where $R_{it,t+s}$ denotes revenues from good i at time $t+s$ conditional on the price set at date t.

Backward-looking retailers are assumed to obey the following rule of thumb, as in Galí and Gertler (1999):

$$p_t^b = \pi_{t-1} \overline{p}_{t-1}, \tag{35}$$

where π_t is the gross inflation rate in t and $\overline{p}_t$ is the average of the newly reset prices at date t.

Finally, the model is closed by imposing the economy-wide resource constraint

$$c_t = y_t, \tag{36}$$

and the market clearing condition in the intermediate good sector

$$y_t = n_t (1 - \rho_t) h_t, \tag{37}$$

where y_t is aggregate demand, $n_t (1 - \rho_t)$ is the number of firms actually producing in t and h_t is each firm's production.

3.4 Monetary authority

The monetary authority conducts monetary policy using the short-term nominal interest rate as the policy instrument and lets the nominal amount of money adjusting accordingly. The gross nominal interest rate r_t^n follows a Taylor-type rule of the following type:

$$r_t^n = \beta^{-(1-\rho_m)} \left(r_{t-1}^n\right)^{\rho_m} E_t \left(\pi_{t+1}\right)^{\gamma_\pi (1-\rho_m)} z_t^{\gamma_y (1-\rho_m)} e^{\varepsilon_t^m}. \tag{38}$$

The parameter ρ_m measures the degree of interest rate smoothing and is included following the empirical evidence presented in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000). The parameters γ_π and γ_y are the response coefficients of inflation and the output gap, denoted with z_t. Finally, ε_t^m is an i.i.d. monetary policy shock.

3.5 Limited information decisions

Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and others, I assume that households must choose their consumption level at date t with the information set available at date $t-2$. In addition, I make a similar assumption for the decisions to set prices, post vacancies and separate. These assumptions are consistent with the identifying restriction imposed in the VAR considered in Section 2, according to which all variables in the information set of the central bank do not respond contemporaneously to a monetary shock.[20]

4 Real marginal costs with search and matching frictions

Inflation dynamics in the model are determined by the behavior of real marginal costs, according to a conventional backward-looking NK Phillips curve, which can be obtained by log-linearizing the price setting conditions. What changes relative to the baseline framework with a neoclassical labor market is the behavior of real marginal costs. The presence of search and matching frictions changes the nature of real marginal costs because it affects both the way the labor input is used to produce output and the way its price is determined.

First, recall that the relative price of intermediate goods x_t coincides with the real marginal cost faced by retailers. Then, in order to shed some light on the determination of the real marginal cost, note that final goods output is produced according to equation (37):

$$y_t = n_t (1 - \rho_t) h_t,$$

which says that output can be changed either by changing the number of hours that each employed worker supplies, h_t, or by changing the number of employed workers producing in t, $n_t (1 - \rho_t)$. Since it takes time to hire a new worker through vacancy posting and matching, i.e., the stock of currently employed workers, n_t, is predetermined, the number of producing workers at time t can only be changed by varying the rate at which currently employed workers are separated from their jobs, ρ_t. In other words, output can be raised to meet a higher demand either by increasing the number of hours supplied, h_t, or by raising the number of employed workers producing in t through a reduction in the job destruction rate, ρ_t. This implies that the hours per worker and the endogenous job destruction rate adjust to meet demand so that in equilibrium their marginal costs are equalized.

The optimal condition for the determination of hours (24) gives the cost of producing one additional unit of output by increasing hours worked:

$$x_t = \kappa_h \frac{h_t^{\phi}}{\lambda_t}$$

[20] See Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Boivin and Giannoni (2005) for a brief discussion.

It equals the marginal disutility of supplying one additional hour normalized by the marginal utility of consumption. It is important to note that while this condition turns out to have exactly the same form as in a neoclassical labor market, there are two important differences. First, in a neoclassical labor market, the wage adjusts to equate the value of the marginal product of hours, x_t, to the marginal rate of substitution, $\kappa_h h_t^{\phi}/\lambda_t$. In contrast, with privately efficient bargaining and search and matching frictions, the wage plays no allocational role for hours, meaning that a firm and a worker determine hours by equating costs and benefits of additional hours for the match as a whole. The wage only represents a transfer between the worker and the firm and needs not to be equal to neither the value of the marginal product nor to the marginal rate of substitution. Second, condition (24) in the current model determines hours per worker, the intensive margin, as opposed to total hours in the neoclassical framework. Because in the model with search it will turn out that most of the adjustment of the labor input occurs at the extensive margin, this has the important implication that, other things being equal, the marginal cost will change significantly less than in the baseline model where all variation in total hours occurs at the intensive margin. Thus, the ability of the model to reproduce the important feature of the data that the labor input responds to monetary shocks mostly at the extensive margin, makes the model also better able to account for the sluggish response of inflation to monetary shocks.

The analysis of what determines the marginal cost of producing output by changing the job destruction rate is specific to this model and new in the literature. It can be illustrated by interpreting the condition that determines endogenous job destruction, equation (26), which can be rearranged as:

$$x_t = \frac{1}{h_t}\left(b + \frac{g(h_t, \underline{a}_t)}{\lambda_t}\right) - \frac{1-\eta s_t}{1-\eta}\frac{\kappa}{\lambda_t q_t h_t}$$

The cost of producing one additional unit of output by increasing employment through a reduction in the job destruction rate has two components. The first is the flow cost (per hour) of keeping one additional worker employed: the foregone unemployment benefit plus the disutility from supplying hours of work. Note that the additional worker is one who survives at the margin. That is, the realization of his preference shock corresponds to the threshold value $\underline{a}_t$. The second term represents the (per hour) expected future joint payoffs from continuing the relationship in the following periods. Because firms and workers have long term employment relationships, the marginal cost is given by the flow cost net of the expected future payoffs associated with preserving an additional match through a reduction in separations. It is less straightforward to use equation (26), as opposed to equation (24), to compare the behavior of marginal costs with the standard NK model. To gain some intuition, note that in a neoclassical labor market the marginal cost would simply be equal to the marginal rate of substitution. Similarly, here the first component of marginal costs is positively related to the labor supply disutility. However, since expected future payoffs from continuing the relationship are procyclical, the response of x_t to a monetary shock is dampened by the presence of the second component.[21] Note finally that with Nash bargaining the wage does not play any allocational role for the decision to continue or separate a match, or the decision of how many hours to work.

5 Model dynamics

The dynamics of the model are obtained by taking a log-linear approximation around a deterministic steady state with zero inflation. The complete log-linearized model is described below, where variables with a "hat" denote log-deviations from the steady state value, while variables without a time subscript denote steady state values.

Taylor-type interest rate rule

$$\widehat{r}_t^n = \rho_m \widehat{r}_{t-1}^n + (1-\rho_m)\gamma_\pi E_t \widehat{\pi}_{t+1} + (1-\rho_m)\gamma_y \widehat{y}_t + \varepsilon_t^m \tag{39}$$

Euler equation

$$\widehat{\lambda}_t = E_t \widehat{\lambda}_{t+1} + \widehat{r}_t \tag{40}$$

Marginal utility of consumption

$$\left(1+\beta e^2\right)\widehat{c}_t = E_{t-2}\left[e\widehat{c}_{t-1} + \beta e \widehat{c}_{t+1} - (1-e)(1-\beta e)\widehat{\lambda}_t\right] \tag{41}$$

Real interest rate

$$\widehat{r}_t = \widehat{r}_t^n - E_t \widehat{\pi}_{t+1} \tag{42}$$

Hours per worker

$$\widehat{x}_t = \phi \widehat{h}_t - \widehat{\lambda}_t \tag{43}$$

Phillips curve

$$\widehat{\pi}_t = E_{t-2}\left[\varphi_x \widehat{x}_t + \varphi_f \widehat{\pi}_{t+1} + \varphi_b \widehat{\pi}_{t-1}\right] \tag{44}$$

with $\varphi_x = \frac{(1-\beta\varphi)(1-\varphi)(1-\omega)}{\xi}$, $\varphi_f = \frac{\beta\varphi}{\xi}$, $\varphi_b = \frac{\omega}{\xi}$ and $\xi = \varphi + \omega\left[1-\varphi(1-\beta)\right]$

Resource constraint

$$\widehat{y}_t = \widehat{c}_t \tag{45}$$

Market clearing

$$\widehat{y}_t = \widehat{h}_t + \widehat{n}_t + \eta_{F,\underline{a}} \widehat{\underline{a}}_t \tag{46}$$

with $\eta_{F,\underline{a}} = \frac{\partial F(\underline{a})/F(\underline{a})}{\partial \underline{a}/\underline{a}}$

[21] Since the firm and the worker share the joint surplus according to the parameter η, $S_t(\underline{a}_t) = 0$ is equivalent to $J_t(\underline{a}_t) = 0$. Substituting and rearranging, then, one could write marginal costs as $x_t = w_t(\underline{a}_t) - \frac{\kappa}{\lambda_t q_t h_t}$. In this case, the marginal cost is the hourly wage paid to the additional worker (evaluated at the threshold value of the preference shock) minus the savings per hour in terms of expected costs of hiring a worker, given by $\frac{\kappa}{\lambda_t q_t h_t}$.

Matching function

$$\widehat{m}_t = \sigma \widehat{u}_t + (1-\sigma)\,\widehat{v}_t \tag{47}$$

Transition probabilities

$$\widehat{q}_t = \widehat{m}_t - \widehat{v}_t \tag{48}$$

$$\widehat{s}_t = \widehat{m}_t - \widehat{u}_t \tag{49}$$

Market tightness

$$\widehat{\theta}_t = \widehat{v}_t - \widehat{u}_t \tag{50}$$

Employment

$$\widehat{n}_t = (1-\rho)\,\widehat{n}_{t-1} + (1-\rho)\,\eta_{F,\underline{a}}\widehat{\underline{a}}_{t-1} + \rho \widehat{m}_{t-1} \tag{51}$$

Searching workers

$$\widehat{u}_t = -\frac{n}{u}(1-\rho)\left(\widehat{n}_t + \eta_{F,\underline{a}}\widehat{\underline{a}}_t\right) \tag{52}$$

Vacancy posting condition

$$\widehat{v}_t = E_{t-2}\left[\widehat{u}_t + \nu_1\left(\widehat{x}_{t+1} + \widehat{h}_{t+1}\right) + \nu_2 \widehat{\theta}_{t+1} + \nu_3 \widehat{\lambda}_{t+1}\right] \tag{53}$$

with $\nu_1 = \frac{\phi}{1+\phi} xh\lambda \frac{\Gamma(\underline{a})}{\sigma}$, $\nu_2 = \frac{\beta(1-\rho)(\sigma-\eta s)}{\sigma}$, $\nu_3 = \frac{\Gamma(\underline{a})+1-\beta(1-\rho)(1-\eta s)}{\sigma}$, $\Gamma(\underline{a}) = \left[\underline{a} - \int_0^{\underline{a}} a \frac{dF(a)}{F(\underline{a})}\right]^{-1}$

Separation condition

$$\widehat{\underline{a}}_t = E_{t-2}\left[\varsigma_1\left(\widehat{x}_t + \widehat{h}_t\right) + \varsigma_2 \widehat{\theta}_t + \varsigma_3 \widehat{\lambda}_t\right] \tag{54}$$

with $\varsigma_1 = \frac{\phi}{1+\phi}\frac{xh\lambda}{\underline{a}}$, $\varsigma_2 = \frac{\sigma-\eta s}{1-\eta}\frac{\kappa}{q\underline{a}}$, $\varsigma_3 = 1 - \frac{1-\eta s}{1-\eta}\frac{\kappa}{q\underline{a}}$

Job creation rate

$$\widehat{jc}_t = \chi\left(\widehat{m}_t - \widehat{n}_t\right) + (1-\chi)\,\widehat{q}_t \tag{55}$$

with $\chi = \frac{1}{1-\alpha q}$ and $\alpha = \frac{\rho^x}{\rho}$

Job destruction rate

$$\widehat{jd}_t = -\chi \frac{1-\rho}{\rho}\eta_{F,\underline{a}}\widehat{\underline{a}}_t + (1-\chi)\,\widehat{q}_t \tag{56}$$

Allowing for variation of the labor input at the two margins has the implication that the model presented in this paper nests the standard NK model with a neoclassical labor market. The latter can be obtained by assuming that the rates of job creation and job destruction are constant at their steady state values. This implies that all labor market variables specific to the search and matching framework are also constant at their steady state values.[22] The standard NK model,

[22] These variables are n_t, u_t, m_t, s_t, q_t, $\underline{a}_t$, v_t and θ_t.

then, is described by equations (39)-(46), where in equation (46) $\widehat{n}_t$ and $\widehat{\underline{a}}_t$ are both equal to zero.[23] This has the extremely convenient implication that the two models can be easily comparable. In particular, any difference in the dynamics of those variables that belong to both models must be associated with the dynamics of job creation and job destruction, which in turn determine the dynamics of employment.

6 Bringing the model to the data

In this Section I describe the econometric methodology that I use to evaluate the model developed in Section 3. The model parameters can be divided in three groups. The first group is composed by the parameters that characterize the Taylor rule and is given by $\left\{\rho_m, \gamma_\pi, \gamma_y\right\}$. The second group is given by the structural parameters that affect the dynamics of both the search model and the baseline NK model. This group is given by $\{\beta, \phi, \kappa_h, e, \varepsilon, \varphi, \omega\}$. The third group includes the structural parameters that describe the labor market in the search model. This group does not affect the dynamics of the standard NK model and is composed by $\{\alpha, \sigma, \eta, \mu_a, \sigma_a, \rho, q, n\}$.[24]

First, I set the Taylor rule parameters as follows: the interest rate smoothing parameter ρ_m is set to be equal to 0.85, and the parameters γ_π and γ_y to 1.5 and 0.5, respectively. These values are roughly consistent with the estimates presented in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000).

Second, I calibrate the parameters of the second group, with the exception of the habit persistence parameter e. Specifically, I set the quarterly discount factor β to 0.99, which implies a quarterly real rate of interest of approximately 1 percent. In order to calibrate the parameter ϕ, note first that $1/\phi$ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of leisure. The value of this elasticity has been a substantial source of controversy in the literature. Most microeconomic studies estimates this elasticity to be small, close to 0 and not higher than 0.5.[25] Students of the business cycle, however, tend to work with elasticities that are much higher than microeconomic estimates, typically unity and above. In such a way they can approximate the absence of the extensive margin variation of the labor input. Since the model that I develop in this paper can account for both margins, I accordingly set ϕ equal to 10, which implies an elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 0.1. I set the probability that a firm does not change its price within a given period, φ, equal to 0.85, implying that the average period between price adjustments is around 6.5 quarters. The fraction ω of backward-looking retailers is set to 0.5. Both values are consistent with the estimates in Galí and Gertler (1999).[26] I assume that the markup of prices on marginal costs is on average

[23] It is true that I still have constant equilibrium unemployment, job creation and job destruction, which are absent from the baseline model. However, since they are constant and since their steady state values do not enter the system of equations characterizing the NK benchmark, they do not affect the dynamic behavior of the other endogenous variables.

[24] To be precise, ρ, q and n are targeted steady state values. Accordingly, the parameters σ_m, κ and b are calculated from steady state relationships.

[25] For a survey of the literature see Card (1994).

[26] It is important to point out that it is not necessary to rely on such high values of the parameters φ and ω to

10 percent. This amounts to setting ε equal to 11. Finally, I normalize the time spent working in the steady state, h, to 1/3 and set κ_h accordingly.

Third, I estimate most of the structural parameters that characterize the labor market in the search model. Moreover, since the habit persistence parameter is important to explain the dynamics of the labor market, I include it in the group of parameters to be estimated. The following two sections describe the estimation procedure and results.

6.1 Minimum distance estimation

I follow the estimation strategy adopted in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Boivin and Giannoni (2005) in using a limited information minimum distance estimator. Specifically, the structural parameters are chosen so that the impulse responses to the monetary shock of the endogenous variables in the model match as closely as possible the responses estimated from the VAR.

More formally, denote with Ψ the vector of structural labor-market parameters to be estimated and with $g_M(\Psi)$ the vector-valued function containing the model-based impulse response functions. Then, denote with Φ the vector of the estimated VAR coefficients and with $g_V(\Phi)$ the vector-valued function containing the VAR-based impulse response functions. The minimum distance estimator, $\widehat{\Psi}$, can be obtained by minimizing the objective function

$$L(\Psi) = [g_M(\Psi) - g_V(\Phi)]' \Lambda [g_M(\Psi) - g_V(\Phi)],$$

with respect to Ψ and subject to the theoretical constraints on the values of the parameters. In the objective function, Λ denotes a diagonal weighting matrix with the inverse of each impulse response's variance along the diagonal. The choice of this weighting matrix effectively takes into account that some of the points estimates of the impulse responses are less accurate than others. Finally, I consider in the estimation the impulse responses of the variables r_t^n, y_t, π_t, n_t, h_t, jc_t and jd_t over the first twenty periods after the monetary policy shock.

As Dridi and Renault (2001) and Boivin and Giannoni (2005) point out, although this estimation strategy is similar in the spirit to a calibration exercise, it produces consistent estimates of the structural parameters on which it is possible to perform statistical inference. Moreover, given that the main purpose of this study is to explain the response of the economy to a monetary policy shock, the estimation based on the impulse responses permits me to focus on the moments of the data that the model seeks to explain.

Among the labor market parameters and steady state values, three of them can be easily calibrated from the data. In particular, the empirical literature provides us with several measures

explain inflation dynamics in the data. In particular, I could allow for heterogeneous labor services as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Boivin and Giannoni (2005) and, everything else equal, significantly reduce the value of both parameters. However, for clarity of presentation and analogously to Galí and Gertler (1999), I do not include in the model this additional feature. Moreover, as I discuss below, the important result is that for given values of φ and ω, whichever values I assume, the response of inflation is much smaller than in the baseline NK model.

of the U.S. worker separation rate. Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) compute a quarterly worker separation rate of about 8 percent, while Hall (1995) reports this rate to be between 8 and 10 percent. Accordingly, I set the overall separation rate ρ to 0.08. In order to calibrate α, I follow den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000). First, as previously discussed, they assume that only exogenous separations are reposted. Then, based on evidence reported by Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, they calculate that the rate at which separations are reposted by firms is equal to 0.68. This implies that $\alpha = 0.68$ and $\rho^x = 0.054$. Then, I set the steady state probability that a firm fills a vacancy, q, to be equal to 0.7, as in Cooley and Quadrini (1999) and den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000). This value imply that the average time until a vacancy is filled is 1.4 quarters. The vector of parameters and steady state values to be estimated, then, is given by $\Psi = [\sigma, \eta, n, e, \mu_a, \sigma_a]$. Below I discuss why I choose to estimate the steady state employment rate n.

6.2 Estimation results

The estimates of the parameters σ, η, n, e, μ_a and σ_a are reported in Table 1, along with the corresponding standard errors. I perform the estimation in three stages. In the first stage I estimate all six parameters. The results are reported in the second column of Table 1. The elasticity of new matches with respect to the number of searching workers, σ, is estimated to be 0.56. This value is higher but not too far from the estimate of 0.4 obtained by Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and it is consistent with the evidence summarized by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).

The estimate of the habit persistence parameter, e, is 0.55. This is close to the estimate of 0.63 reported in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). As previously mentioned, besides helping the model to reproduce the hump-shaped responses of output and consumption, the presence of habit formation in preferences also enhances the ability of the model to account for the joint response of the extensive and intensive margins of variation of the labor input. Without habit persistence, in particular, the initial response of hours per worker would be significantly higher, although still as transitory as in the data.

The reason why I choose to estimate the steady state employment ratio n is that on one hand it may have considerable effects on the dynamics of the labor market, on the other there is no unambiguous way to calibrate it from the data. More precisely, as an example, Andolfatto (1996) sets the employment rate n to 0.54, while den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) set it to 0.89. These values, which are obviously lower than in the data, can be justified by interpreting the unmatched workers in the model as being both unemployed and partly out of the labor force. This interpretation is consistent with the abstraction in the model from labor force participation decisions. Another way to rationalize a lower value for n is the following. It is assumed in order to capture labor force participation changes. When the steady state fraction of searchers is low, the model implies that a small percentage decrease in the number of employed workers causes a large percentage increase in the numbers of workers looking for a job. This, in turn, raises significantly the probability of filling a vacancy. In reality, however, a lower probability of finding a job reduces the labor force participation. In that case, a decrease in the number of employed people does not necessarily translates in a one-to-one increase in the number of people searching for a job. As a result, the probability of filling a vacancy may increase by a lower amount. A possible way to take this labor force participation effect into account is to assume a higher steady state value for the fraction of searching workers. The estimate of n that I obtain is 0.75. This estimate lies between the value used by Andolfatto (1996) and that used by den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000).

Table 1: Estimates of structural labor market parameters

Parameters	Estimates I	Estimates II	Estimates III
σ	0.558	0.558	0.545
	(0.7683)	(0.4080)	(0.2839)
η	0.1	0.102	0.5
	(9.1995)	(7.8054)	(−)
n	0.753	0.753	0.747
	(0.3605)	(0.0974)	(0.1022)
e	0.549	0.549	0.55
	(0.0468)	(0.0465)	(0.0562)
μ_a	3e-009	0	0
	(−)	(−)	(−)
σ_a	0.410	0.410	0.382
	(1.0663)	(0.7006)	(0.0868)

Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. (−) denotes that the standard error is not available, either because the parameter is calibrated or is hitting the parameter space boundary.

The relative bargaining power, η, is estimated to be 0.1. However, this parameter is extremely imprecisely estimated. That is, its value cannot be determined by the data. This may suggest that η does not have a large effect on the dynamics of the model. I return on this point below. Finally, the estimate of the parameter μ_a of the lognormal is driven to 0 and the estimate of the parameter σ_a is 0.41.[27] These values, in turn, determine the steady state value of the threshold, $\underline{a}$, and the elasticity of output to changes in the threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock, $\eta_{F,\underline{a}}$, from the steady state relationships. The implied values for $\underline{a}$ and $\eta_{F,\underline{a}}$ are, respectively, 2.2 and 0.17.

In the second stage of the estimation, I set the value of μ_a to 0 and estimate σ, η, n, e and σ_a. The results are reported in the third column of Table 1. As can be seen from the table, the new estimates are the same as the estimates in the first stage, only the standard errors are lower. However, the bargaining power η remains imprecisely estimated. For this reason, in the third stage I simply set η to 0.5 - a value that assigns equal bargaining power to the worker and the firm - and

[27] The values of the mean and the variance of a_t can then be calculated to be 1.1 and 0.2, respectively.

estimate σ, n, e and σ_a. The fourth column of Table 1 reports the estimation results and shows that the estimates of all parameters are almost unaffected by setting η to 0.5. This confirms the above suggestion that the bargaining power has a negligible impact on the dynamic behavior of the model. The final estimates obtained in the third stage are all statistical significant.

Finally, given the above estimates, the steady state probability that a worker finds a job, s, is calculated from the steady state relationships to be 0.2, implying that the average time until a worker finds a job is 5 quarters. Recall that in the model we have interpreted the pool of searching workers as both unemployed and partly out of the labor force. The parameters κ and b are also derived from the steady state calculation and are equal to 0.4 and 0.03, respectively. The latter, in particular, implies a replacement rate of about 0.16.

7 Findings

First, I assess the contribution of labor market frictions in shaping the dynamics of the economy relatively to the contribution of other frictions present in the model. In order to do this, I compare the predictions of the model developed in this paper - which I will refer to, for simplicity, as the search model - with those of a baseline NK model with a neoclassical labor market. More specifically, the baseline NK model that I consider is obtained from the search model simply by assuming away search and matching frictions or, equivalently, by shutting down endogenous job creation and job destruction. All other features of the model - frictions, parameters and information lags - are kept unchanged. Therefore, any difference in the dynamics of the economy and, in particular, in the predicted joint behavior of output and inflation in the two models must be associated with the presence of labor market frictions.

Figure 3 shows the response of output, inflation, marginal costs and hours to a one percent increase in the nominal interest rate in the two models.[28] Note that in the search model I plot hours per worker rather than total hours. All variables have a similar qualitative response in the search and the baseline NK model. The tightening in monetary policy reduces output of final goods and hours worked. The fall in output and hours can only occur at decreased marginal costs. Finally, because prices are set based on expected future marginal costs, inflation decreases.

From a quantitative point of view, however, the search and the baseline model behave extremely differently. First, the search model generates a much lower volatility of inflation relatively to the volatility of output. While in the baseline model a peak decrease in output of about 0.23 percent is associated with a peak fall in inflation of around 0.63 percent, in the search model output falls by about 0.33 percent and inflation by only 0.27 percent. More precisely, the ratio of inflation standard deviation to output standard deviation is 0.74 in the baseline model and 0.20 in the search model. The relative volatility in the search model is very close to the value of 0.17 found in the data (see

[28] Although the equations in the model involve a quarterly inflation rate, for clarity reasons I plot the annualized inflation rate.

Table 2). Second, the search model generates a significantly more persistent response of output. In the baseline model output goes back to its steady state value after 9 quarters, while in the search model it takes around 20 quarters. In order to quantify more precisely the increase in output persistence, I calculate that in the search model 68 percent of the cumulative response of output occurs after the fourth quarter and 18 percent after the eighth quarter. In the baseline model, instead, only 46 percent of the cumulative decrease occurs after the fourth quarter and almost 0 percent after the eight quarter. Finally, I obtain the following statistics. I calculate the ratio of the amount of time when the response of output is negative to the number of periods in a typical contract. Following Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), I call this number the contract multiplier. This statistic is equal to 1.05 in the baseline model and to 2.7 in the search model. Third, as an additional way to asses the contribution of labor market frictions in accounting for output and inflation dynamics, I calculate that the search model would generate responses of output and inflation similar to those in the baseline model if the average time a firm must keep prices fixed is reduced from around 6.6 quarters to a much lower value of 3.3 quarters, everything else equal.

The lower volatility of inflation relative to output and the larger persistence of output are caused by the substantially lower elasticity of marginal costs with respect to output. The figure shows that a given fall in output is associated with a much lower decrease in the level of marginal costs than in the baseline model. In turn, smaller variations in marginal costs induce firms setting their prices to make smaller adjustments in prices. This increases the sluggishness of the aggregate price level to changes in aggregate demand and reduces the volatility of inflation. Finally, the lower sensitivity of the price level to variations in aggregate demand raises the persistence of the response of aggregate demand and output to a monetary shock.

The elasticity of marginal costs with respect to output is lower in the search model because the labor input can vary at both the intensive and the extensive margin. To see this, combine the loglinear version of equations (24) and (37) to obtain $\widehat{x}_t = \phi\left(\widehat{y}_t - \widehat{n}_t - \eta_{F,\underline{a}}\widehat{\underline{a}}_t\right) - \widehat{\lambda}_t$. For a given change in output, the change in marginal cost is lower the larger is the share of the fluctuation in total hours that takes the form of fluctuations in employment, through changes in the job destruction rate. Figure 4 plots the responses of total hours, employment (after job destruction has taken place) and hours per worker in the search model. The percent change in total hours is the sum of percent changes in employment and hours per worker. The figure shows that the decrease in the number of people working is significantly larger and more persistent than the fall in the hours per worker. Initially, the fall in the demand for intermediate goods reduces its relative price and reduces hours per worker. At the same time, the lower profitability of firms induces less firms to post vacancies and more firms to separate from their workers. As the number of intermediate goods firms producing gradually decreases, the demand of intermediate goods per firm gradually increases. As a consequence, the responses of output per firm and hours of work in the intermediate goods sector are reverted fairly quickly.

It must be emphasized that I have assumed a degree of intertemporal substitution in the supply of hours that is consistent with microeconomic estimates. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution of leisure is assumed to be equal to 0.1. Instead, general equilibrium models of the business cycle, among which sticky prices models, tend to assume much higher values of this elasticity, typically unit and above. By doing so, they can approximate some implications of the model with both margins of adjustment. In particular, the baseline NK model that I consider can approximately replicate the joint behavior of output and inflation in the search model if the elasticity is increased from a value of 0.1 to values between 1.5 and 2, everything else unchanged. Of course, such a model cannot explain what drives fluctuations in employment as opposed to hours per worker, why there is unemployment in equilibrium or, more generally, it cannot explain the behavior of the labor market over the business cycle.

Figure 5 presents the dynamics of the labor market in the search model after a monetary policy shock. The response of employment is explained by the dynamics of job creation and job destruction. Recall, from equation (29), that employment growth is given by $\frac{n_{t+1}-n_t}{n_t} = jc_t - jd_t$. Thus, employment falls if job creation is lower than job destruction. As can be seen from the figure, a contractionary monetary shock decreases job creation and raises job destruction. The raise in job destruction is slightly greater and significantly more persistent than the decrease in job creation. Thus, most of the decrease in employment is due to the response of job destruction, rather than job creation. In particular, while the reduction in job destruction persists for nine periods, job creation raises above the steady state in the fourth period and above the job destruction rate in the fifth period. This implies that from the sixth period on employment begins to raise and unemployment to decline.

The responses of job creation and destruction, in turn, can be explained as follows. A persistent raise in the nominal interest rate causes a decrease in current and expected future aggregate demand. The fall in aggregate demand, in turn, decreases the demand for intermediate goods and the profits of firms producing them. This diminishes the value of the idiosyncratic shock above which the firm and the worker decide to separate and raises the separation rate. Because of the timing assumption, the monetary shock only affects the threshold value of the idiosyncratic shock and the separation rate after two periods. The decrease in profits also reduces the value of opening a vacancy and induces firms to post less vacancies. The decrease in the number of posted vacancies diminishes both the number of new matches and the job creation rate. Again, the number of vacancies and the job creation rate respond to the monetary shock with a two-period delay.

The decrease in the number of posted vacancies and the increase in the number of searching workers cause the labor market tightness to decrease. Thus, the probability of filling a vacancy raises while the probability of finding a job drops. The higher probability of hiring a worker increases the attractiveness of hiring activities and the expected future value of a match. Therefore, job creation starts to increase and job destruction to fall.

Figure 6 plots the model impulse responses of output, inflation and the nominal interest rate to the monetary shock against the estimated impulse responses in the U.S. economy. Figure 7 plots the model responses of employment, hours per worker, the job creation rate and the job destruction rate against the estimated responses in the U.S. economy. The solid and dashed lines denote, respectively, the estimated impulse responses and the two standard deviations confidence intervals, while the lines with circles denote the simulated responses in the model.[29] As Figure 6 and 7 show, the model does a good job in accounting for the dynamic response of the U.S. economy to a monetary shock.

The first dimension in which the model can reproduce the data is the joint dynamic behavior of output and inflation. Basically, the simulated responses of output and inflation are everywhere within the respective confidence intervals. However, while the model generates significantly more persistence in output than the baseline NK model, Figure 6 suggests that output is not yet as persistent as in the data. Second, the model is able to reproduce the quantitative behavior of the variation of the labor input at both margins of adjustment. It generates a small, transitory fall in hours per worker together with a larger, more persistent fall in employment. Likewise the response of output, however, the response of employment is less persistent than in the data. Third, the model explains the joint behavior of job creation and job destruction. In particular, it can account for the larger response of job destruction than job creation and for the observed upturn in job creation. This upturn occurs because the larger pool of unemployed workers looking for a job stimulates firms to post new vacancies. The model can also account for the higher degree of persistence in job destruction with respect to job creation that is observed in the data. Note that the simulated impulse responses of all four labor market variables are everywhere within the respective confidence intervals.

Table 2: Conditional variance ratios

	σ_π/σ_y	σ_n/σ_y	σ_h/σ_y	σ_{jc}/σ_y	σ_{jd}/σ_y
Model	0.20	0.73	0.16	4.62	5.31
Data	0.17	0.89	0.20	5.10	7.68

Finally, in Table 2, I report the ratio of the conditional variance of inflation, employment, hours per worker, job creation and job destruction to that of output, both in the model and in the data.[30] The model is quite successful at replicating the relative variances of the endogenous variables on which the analyses is focused, even though the conditional variances of all labor market variables are somewhat below the respective values in the data.

[29] Again, for clarity and comparison reasons I plot the annualized inflation and nominal interest rates.

[30] See Galì (1999) for a discussion on how to calculate conditional moments.

8 Conclusions

This paper builds on the NK theory of money and inflation and the modern theory of equilibrium unemployment. Both theories have been introduced previously in the macroeconomic literature and extensively used for both normative and positive analysis. But the combination of these theories into a single dynamic general equilibrium model provides new insights on the linkages between money, business cycle fluctuations and the dynamics of the labor market.

When labor market search is incorporated into a standard NK model, implying that changes in the labor input can occur at both the intensive and the extensive margin, the ability of the model to explain the response of output and inflation to monetary shocks improves along a number of dimensions. This happens because introducing search and matching frictions modifies the nature of real marginal costs faced by firms in a way that lowers the elasticity of marginal costs with respect to output. In general, the estimated model does a good job in accounting quantitatively for the response of the U.S. economy to a monetary shock. Moreover, the ability of the model to account for the joint dynamics of output and inflation relies on its ability to explain the dynamics in the labor market.

A number of recent papers, beginning with Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005), consider the role of real wage rigidity in explaining labor market dynamics within a baseline Mortensen and Pissarides model.[31] By enhancing the cyclicality of firms' profits and incentives to hire, wage stickiness helps to account for the volatility of labor market activity that is observed in the data. Moreover, as emphasized by Hall (2005), because wage rigidity affects employment at the extensive margin, in these frameworks the Barro's critique does not apply. These analyses differ from the one conducted in this paper in several aspects: they study non monetary models, only consider the extensive margin and, finally, evaluate the model against unconditional moments taking technology shocks as the exogenous force driving fluctuations. Nevertheless, they suggest that wage rigidities might improve the performance of the present model by raising the volatility of labor market activity, conditional on a monetary shock, closer to the data. It seems particularly promising to incorporate in the current framework the model of wage rigidity developed by Gertler and Trigari (2005), who modify a baseline Mortensen and Pissarides model to allow for multiperiod staggered wage setting. Interestingly, however, recent work by Krause and Lubik (2005) introduces wage rigidity, in the form of an ad hoc wage rule, in a NK model with search and finds that it only weekly affects the dynamics of marginal costs and inflation. I leave further investigation of the role of wage rigidity for future research.

[31] See Hall (2005) for a survey.

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Appendix

Derivation of the surplus from employment for a worker

This section of the Appendix shows how the surplus from employment for a worker - the difference between the employment and unemployment values - can be obtained from the family's problem. In this way, it is possible to rationalize the existence of bargaining between workers and firms when workers are perfectly insured against the risk of being unemployed, as it is assumed in the paper. The argument is based on the assumption that workers value their actions in terms of the contribution these actions give to the utility of the family to which they belong. This implies that the surplus from employment for a worker can be defined as the change in the family's utility from having one additional member employed.

Suppose that there is a continuum of identical families indexed on the unit interval. Each of these families has a continuum of members indexed by $i \in [0,1]$. At time t, a fraction $n_t^a = n_t(1-\rho_t)$ of these members is employed, while the remaining fraction $1-n_t^a$ is unemployed. Note that n_t^a denotes the number of individuals producing in period t. This is different from n_t, the number of individuals that are employed at the beginning of period t, previously to the realization of the idiosyncratic shock. The representative family's optimal value function, denoted with Ω_t, can be written as:

$$\Omega_t\left(n_t^a\right) = u(c_t, c_{t-1}) - \int_0^{n_t^a} g\left(h_t, a_{it}\right) di + \beta E_t\left[\Omega_{t+1}\left(n_{t+1}^a\right) \mid a_{it+1} \leq \underline{a}_{t+1}\right] \tag{57}$$

Note that the family's disutility from having a fraction n_t^a of its members supplying hours of work, previously denoted with G_t, is made explicit in (57) and is equal to $\int^{n_t^a} g\left(h_t, a_{it}\right) di$. The symbol a_{it} denotes the idiosyncratic shocks to the individual i's disutility from working.

Each family faces the following budget constraint:

$$c_t + \frac{B_t}{p_t r_t^n} = \int_0^{n_t^a} w_t\left(a_{it}\right) h_t di + \left(1-n_t^a\right) b + \delta_t + \frac{B_{t-1}}{p_t} \tag{58}$$

where the per capita family's income, previously denoted with d_t, is the sum of the first three terms on the right-hand side of the budget constraint. More precisely, the family obtains income from having a fraction n_t^a of its members working at the hourly wage $w_t\left(a_{it}\right)$ and a fraction $1-n_t^a$ obtaining unemployment benefits b. Finally, δ_t denotes the family's per capita share of aggregate profits from retailers and intermediate goods firms, net of lump-sum government taxes.

The fraction of employed members evolves accordingly to the following dynamic equation:

$$n_{t+1}^a = \left(1-\rho_{t+1}\right) n_t^a + s_t\left(1-\rho_{t+1}\right)\left(1-n_t^a\right) \tag{59}$$

where the representative family takes as given the probability s_t at which the search activity by the unemployed members leads to a job match.

Denote now with $\widetilde{S}_t^W(a_{it})$ the surplus from employment for a worker. As previously said, this is defined as the change in the family's optimal utility from having an additional member employed, that is,

$$\widetilde{S}_t^W(a_{it}) \equiv \frac{\partial U_t(n_t^a)}{\partial n_t^a} \tag{60}$$

Taking the derivative of Ω_t in (57) with respect to n_t^a subject to equations (58) and (59) gives:

$$\frac{\partial \Omega_t(n_t^a)}{\partial n_t^a} = \lambda_t w_t(a_{it}) h_t - \lambda_t b - g(h_t, a_{it}) + \beta E_t \left[(1-s_t)\left(1-\rho_{t+1}\right) \frac{\partial \Omega_{t+1}\left(n_{t+1}^a\right)}{\partial n_{t+1}^a} \mid a_{it+1} \leq \underline{a}_{t+1} \right] \tag{61}$$

The surplus from employment, then, is given by the following expression:

$$\widetilde{S}_t^W(a_t) = \lambda_t w_t(a_t) h_t - \lambda_t b - g(h_t, a_t) + \beta E_t \left[(1-s_t)\left(1-\rho_{t+1}\right) \int_0^{\underline{a}_{t+1}} \widetilde{S}_{t+1}^W(a_{t+1}) \frac{dF(a_{t+1})}{F\left(\underline{a}_{t+1}\right)} \right] \tag{62}$$

where the index i is omitted for simplicity.

Finally, denote with $S_t^W(a_t)$ the value of the surplus from employment in terms of current consumption of final goods, i.e.,

$$S_t^W(a_t) \equiv \frac{\widetilde{S}_t^W(a_t)}{\lambda_t} \tag{63}$$

After substituting into the above identity the expression for $\widetilde{S}_t^W(a_t)$ and rearranging, the value of the surplus in terms of current consumption can be written as:

$$S_t^W(a_t) = w_t(a_t) h_t - b - \frac{g(h_t, a_t)}{\lambda_t} + E_t \beta_{t,t+1} \left[(1-s_t)\left(1-\rho_{t+1}\right) \int_0^{\underline{a}_{t+1}} S_{t+1}^W(a_{t+1}) \frac{dF(a_{t+1})}{F\left(\underline{a}_{t+1}\right)} \right] \tag{64}$$

This equation corresponds to the difference between the value of employment (14) and the value of unemployment (15) that are reported in the paper.

Identifying monetary policy shocks

In this section of the Appendix I briefly describe the identification strategy of the monetary policy shock. Following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), and others, I assume that the central bank conducts its monetary policy following a simple reaction function. More precisely, in each period t, the policymaker sets its instrument - the short-term nominal rate r_t^n - in a systematic way using a simple rule that exploits the available information at time t, I_t. The monetary policy rule can be written as:

$$r_t^n = F(I_t) + \varepsilon_t^m, \tag{65}$$

where F is a linear function and ε_t^m is the monetary policy shock. The identification scheme is based on the recursiveness assumption, according to which monetary policy shocks are orthogonal to the information set of the monetary authority, I_t.

Let y_t denote the $(n \times 1)$ vector of the variables included in the analysis, i.e., the instrument and the variables in the information set of the monetary authority. The vector y_t is partitioned so that the monetary policy instrument is ordered last, in the n^{th} position. Then, the dynamic behavior of y_t is assumed to be represented by the following VAR of order p:

$$y_t = c + A_1 y_{t-1} + ... + A_p y_{t-p} + B\varepsilon_t, \tag{66}$$

where c is a $(n \times 1)$ vector of constants, the A_i's are $(n \times n)$ matrices of coefficients, B is a $(n \times n)$ lower triangular matrix with unit diagonal elements and ε_t is a $(n \times 1)$ vector of mutually and serially uncorrelated structural shocks with zero mean and constant variance. The n^{th} element of ε_t is the monetary policy shock, ε_t^m. The lower-triangularity of B implies that all variables in the information set are assumed to be predetermined with respect to the monetary policy shock.

Equivalently, we can write:

$$A(L)\, y_t = c + B\varepsilon_t, \tag{67}$$

where $A(L) = [I_n - A_1 L - ... - A_p L^p]$ and L in the lag operator. Using OLS, we can estimate the coefficient matrices $A(L)$, c, B and the variance-covariance matrix of ε_t.

Given these estimates, the impulse responses functions to a monetary shock of the variables belonging to y_t can be obtained from the infinite Moving Average (MA) representation of the structural VAR. This is given by:

$$y_t - y = H(L)\, \varepsilon_t, \tag{68}$$

where $y = [A(L)]^{-1} c$ is the unconditional mean of y_t and $H(L) = [A(L)]^{-1} B$ embeds the impulse response coefficients.

Equivalently, we have:

$$\widehat{y}_t = \varepsilon_t + H_1\varepsilon_{t-1} + H_2\varepsilon_{t-2} + ... + H_s\varepsilon_{t-s} + ..., \tag{69}$$

where $H(L) = [I_n + H_1 L + ... + H_p L^p + ...]$ and $\widehat{y}_t = y_t - y$ is the deviation of y_t from its unconditional mean. In particular, a plot of the $(i, n)^{th}$ element of H_s as a function of s is the estimated impulse response function of $\widehat{y}_{it}$ to a monetary shock, for any variable i in y_t.[32] This dynamic path is invariant to the ordering of the variables contained in I_t.

[32] In practice, the sum in (69) is truncated at a large but finite lag.



Figure 1: Estimated impulse responses to a monetary shock



Figure 2: Estimated impulse responses to a monetary shock



Figure 3: Search versus new keynesian model



Figure 4: Extensive and intensive margin



Figure 5: Labor-market dynamics



Figure 6: Estimated versus model responses



Figure 7: Estimated versus model responses