

House Prices and Credit Constraints

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SUERF, Helsinki, 4 June 2009

Variations across countries

	Mortgage/GDP	Loan-to-value
Denmark	98	80
Finland	31	70-85
France	29	66
Germany	43	70
Iceland	102	80-90
Ireland	59	91-95
Italy	15	80
Netherlands	73	112
Norway	55	60-80
Spain	50	83
Sweden	37	90
UK	78	80

Source: Miles and Pillonca, tables 1 and 2, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 2008.

Why do LTV ratios vary?

- Technology of credit evaluation
- Legal system
- Cost of foreclosure
- Risk-sharing between lender and borrower
 - Lender recourse to borrower assets

Borrowing constraints and housing demand

- Constrained household
 - Assets available for downpayment \Rightarrow housing expenditure
 - Housepricedemand = $\text{Assets} / (1 - \text{LTV}^*)$
 - Elasticity wrt downpayment ratio = -1
- LTV* increased from 85% (US 1990) to 93% (US 2005)
 - Translates into a demand increase for credit constrained households of 114%.
 - With 10% of all households credit constrained the aggregate impact is 11%.

Sensitivity to fundamentals

- $d\text{Housepricedemand}/d\text{Assets} = 1/(1-\text{LTV}^*)$
 - For an owner
 - Assets \approx value of current house minus debt.
 - The higher is LTV* the more sensitive is housepricedemand to asset prices (= house prices).
 - Multiplier effect on house prices.
 - For a given supply of housing, the higher is LTV* the more sensitive are house prices to fundamentals and the more volatile are house prices (Lamont and Stein).
 - Income and user cost coefficients in housing price equations should be functions of LTV.

What drives LTV?

- Technology of credit evaluation.
 - Income prospects of first-time buyers
 - House price expectations
 - Price of risk
 - Sentiment.
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- Is a high LTV problematic?
 - Demand (and hence price) more volatile.
 - Default option closer to being in the money.

Impact on rent

- The two approaches should be seen as complements.
 - Aggregate demand for owner-occupied housing depends on user cost, borrowing constraints and rent.
 - Lowering LTV* increases demand from owner-occupiers, induces some renters to switch to owner-occupancy. This would lower rent and induce some owners to switch to renting.
 - Add income to the price-to-rent models.

Minor quibbles

- Expectations formation
 - Backward looking
 - Optimal forecasts
- Log transformation of user cost
 - Constant elasticity = high sensitivity at low user cost = high sensitivity to measurement errors.
 - Measure of expected capital gains is arbitrary.
 - Constant elasticity is just a pedagogical device.
- Time dummies
- Gradual adjustment does not necessarily reflect "inefficiency".